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Customizable Area Whole Farm Insurance (CAWFI) 
In discussions of alternative risk protection programs, policy makers and farmers are 
sometimes attracted to the whole-farm insurance concept because whole farm insurance can 
pool all risks of a farm into a single insurance policy and can provide insurance more cheaply 
as compared to commodity specific revenue insurance or any individual price and or yield 
insurance products.  For example, last year the Chairman of the House Agriculture 
Committee, Collin Peterson, mentioned that a more flexible whole farm revenue concept 
might be considered a better farm program (Reuters, April 21, 2010).  However, one should 
note that adjusted gross revenue (AGR) and AGR-lite are two whole farm insurance products 
already offered by RMA.  Both are based on the income reported on Schedule F federal 
income tax forms which may not accurately represent the true farm income. The AGR and 
AGR-lite products are complex, in part due to the need to make accrual adjustments to the 
federal Schedule F which is based on cash accounting. Thus, the AGR and AGR-lite products 
balance the choice of very stringent underwriting rules to prevent fraud and moral hazard 
with an operationally simple program that may reward gamesmanship rather than good 
farming practices.  Another issue with farm-level whole farm insurance is that the need to 
understand price variability, yield variability, and price-yield interactions for all the 
commodities grown on a farm makes developing insurance premium complex and opens up 
the potential for adverse selection due to inaccurate rating assumptions (Dismukes and Coble, 
2006). 
Adverse selection and moral hazard are two major insurability problems in crop 
insurance that can be minimized through area-based insurance products (Miranda, 1991). 
Group risk protection (GRP) is an area-yield based crop insurance product offered by the 
Risk Management Agency (RMA) of the U.S. Department of Agriculture. Group risk income 
protection (GRIP) is an area-revenue based product based on county average yields and   3 
futures market prices (Edwards, 2009).  As the area (county) average yield is not perfectly 
correlated with the farm average yield, GRP and GRIP are subject to basis risk. An insured 
farmer may not experience an actual loss but still may receive an indemnity if the county 
experiences a yield or revenue shortfall. Alternatively, a policy holder may not receive an 
indemnity when they experience a farm level loss if there is no loss at the county level 
(Barnett et al., 2005).  
This manuscript evaluates an alternative that could provide significant whole farm 
risk protection while avoiding the potential abuse of farm-level designs.  Specifically, we 
analyze a customizable area whole farm insurance (CAWFI) design. This manuscript 
investigates the safeguards of combining area-revenue insurance with the risk reducing 
effectiveness of whole farm (multiple commodities) coverage. An important component of 
CAWFI is a weighting system that customizes the mix of area coverage to a particular farm’s 
enterprise mix. 
Area based insurance products are more prone to basis risk than farm level products 
but are less affected by moral hazard and adverse selection problems. Whole farm insurance 
can protect risks associated with multiple commodities at a lower premium cost than insuring 
each commodity separately. But whole farm insurance requires complex premium rating and 
indemnity calculations.  
An important challenge for the CAWFI design is accounting for the fact that the crop 
mix on the farm may be quite different than that of the county. A weighting mechanism is 
necessary to customize the area coverage to the farm's crop mix.  One could simply use the 
sum of aggregated commodity revenue by county. However, this implicitly weights all 
commodities by the crop mix of the county. A farm growing a different crop mix could 
potentially receive poor risk protection due to the lack of correlation between farm and   4 
county crop mix. This manuscript proposes a procedure for estimating optimal weights for 
each crop. 
This manuscript develops a simulation model capable of modeling correlated prices 
and yields with mixed marginal distributions at both the farm and county level. CAWFI yield 
and revenue insurance designs are evaluated for a representative Delta farm in Mississippi.  
History of Crop Insurance 
The history of federal government involvement in offering crop insurance in the 
United States begins in the 1930s. Because of the correlated risks, adverse selection, and 
moral hazards problems, it is difficult to develop farm level agricultural insurance products. 
The US government initially offered only yield insurance but later began offering revenue 
insurance products as well. 
The farm level yield insurance product offered in the United States is known as 
Actual Production History (APH) multiple peril crop insurance (MPCI). This product protects 
insured farmers against yield loss caused by multiple perils such as excessive rainfall, 
disease, and drought. MPCI benefits may vary sharply among farms, crops and regions 
(Knight and Coble, 1997). Some perils are also spatially correlated. As a result, if offered 
privately a private insurer would need large capital reserves and/or reinsurance to backstop 
the risk exposure of the insurers (Skees et al. 2008).  
In an attempt to minimize adverse selection and moral hazards problems associated 
with crop insurance, RMA introduced an area-based insurance product, GRP, in 1993.  For 
area based products, the higher the positive correlation between the farm yield and county 
yield, the lower the basis risk (Barnett et al., 2005). GRP has less moral hazard problem and 
lower transaction costs, as it avoids establishing APH yields and no on-farm loss adjustment   5 
is required. GRP basis risk is lower in relatively homogenous production regions. The area-
based insurance products accounted for 9% of federal crop insurance program acres in 2005.  
Area insurance could become an available alternative insurance product instead of farm-level 
insurance even in heterogeneous geographical production regions when premium rates for 
farm level insurance contain large positive wedges (Deng et al., 2007). The wedge is simply 
the difference in the premium cost and expected indemnity for that particular insurance 
product where its positive values inform that premium cost is higher than indemnity expected 
and vice versa.  
The Group Risk Income Protection (GRIP) is an area-revenue product, introduced in 
2000 (Dismukes and Glauber, 2004). Futures market prices and county-level yields are used 
in GRIP revenue calculations and the indemnity is paid based on county revenue shortfalls. 
GRIP represented 3.5% of acres insured under revenue insurance in 2005 (Coble and Miller, 
2006). Note also that Loan Deficiency Payments (LDPs) and Counter Cyclical Payments 
(CCPs) provide only price risk protection whereas GRIP provides revenue risk protection 
(Paulson and Babcock, 2008). Therefore there is some overlap of price and revenue 
protection programs. 
In 1996, crop revenue insurance plans were added in FCIP for the first time. 
Assuming that farm decision makers seek to maximize utility from profits, separate price and 
yield risk protection programs provide risk protection at a higher cost than a single revenue 
insurance product. Crop Revenue Coverage (CRC), Revenue Assurance (RA), and Income 
Protection (IP) are existing revenue insurance programs. Initially, crop revenue insurance 
programs were introduced in limited areas for specific crops.  However, crop revenue 
products rapidly became popular among farmers and now account for the vast majority of 
farm level insurance policies sold. To some extent, revenue insurance products substitute for 
other risk reducing strategies such as hedging using futures or options.  This substitution   6 
effect increases rapidly for revenue insurance coverage levels greater than 70%. Yield 
insurance, on the other hand is complementary to hedging (Coble et al., 2000).  Mishra and 
Goodwin (2006) point out that the revenue insurance can shift taxpayer’s burdens to 
subsidize farmer’s insurance premium more efficiently.  Revenue variability occurs due to 
variation in price and yield, and the correlation between price and yield. Price is determined 
mostly by world markets while yield is based on micro climatic factors, so farm revenue 
tends to be highly responsive to fluctuations in farm yield. In general, the relation between 
price and yield is negative which makes revenue less variable than yield. A more negative 
correlation between price and yield reduces revenue risk. In 2000, whole farm insurance 
products such as AGR and AGR-lite were first introduced. These products had only a 3.53% 
market share in 2005 (Coble and Miller, 2006). 
Price risk protection has been provided through the commodity title of the farm bill 
through loan programs, deficiency payments, and more recently the counter-cyclical 
program, SURE program, and the ACRE program. In the 2008 Farm Bill, the Average Crop 
Revenue Election (ACRE), and Supplemental revenue (SURE) programs were introduced as 
optional income support program.  ACRE provides price as well as yield protection, and is 
based on 2-year national average price and 5-year state average yield. When state and farm 
revenue for the specific crop in the given crop year falls below bench mark revenue, an 
ACRE payment is made. The ACRE program may also substitute for crop insurance products 
because it protects against revenue shortfalls (Cooper, 2010, Zulauf et. al, 2008). The SURE 
program covers revenue losses with payments based on whole farm revenue shortfalls. 
Farmers are eligible for SURE payment when they buy at least the catastrophic level of 
federal crop insurance coverage. The optimal crop insurance coverage level is affected by 
SURE payments to some extent. SURE provides some incentive for farmers to move toward   7 
mid-level coverage (Anderson, Barnett, and Coble, 2009). Thus, these insurance products and 
Farm Bill programs have potential redundancies because they all protect against revenue risk.  
Multivariate Simulation 
Historical multivariate simulation has been most easily performed by assuming 
multivariate normality.  However, imposing normality on the marginal distribution of crop 
yields and prices is often not supported by empirical data. The entire marginal price 
distributions are correlated with each other and the marginal yield distribution are also 
typically correlated. The interaction between price and yield has also been noted. Only by 
using a procedure capable of modeling and simulating multivariate distributions can one 
analyze such complex combinations (Ramirez, 2000). Ramirez notes that, in general, both the 
mean and the variance of the marginal distributions of crop yield and price are found to be 
shifting over time. Marginal price distributions are typically correlated with each other 
because crop production is typically correlated and many crops also substitute for each other 
in output markets.   
The Iman and Conover (IC) procedure (1982) is commonly used to simulate 
multivariate risks in agricultural economics research (Mildenhall, 2005).  Another procedure 
by Phoon, Quek, and Huang (PQH) (2004) has also been used in agricultural economics. The 
PQH is a multivariate simulation technique for correlated stochastic variables from mixed 
marginal distribution based on Eigen decomposition of the rank correlation matrix. 
Comparing with the IC (1982) simulation technique, the PQH (2004) procedure is a 
straightforward and distribution free simulation technique. Anderson, Harri, and Coble 
(2009) find the PQH procedure results in more accurate relations between interdependent 
random variables, as the t-test for the rank correlation matrix from simulated data does not 
differ significantly to that of the original correlation. The PQH simulated data has relatively 
small bias. It is well suited for multi-crop insurance modeling.     8 
 Conceptual Framework 
     The farmer’s portfolio is assumed to consist of multiple crops. The expected return 
on a portfolio of n different crops is expressed as, 
(1.)   ( ) ( ) ∑ =
i i i t portfolio NR E R E v
  
Where,  ( ) i NR E = expected net return for crop i,  i v = the proportion of crop i, and  
∑ =
i i 1 v
 or 100%.  
Assuming two crops 1 and 2 in a portfolio, and  2 , 1 r  is the correlation between them, then the 
variance in portfolio return would be expressed as; 
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Risk averse farmers will have a decreasing marginal utility over ending wealth. This 
study assumes that decision makers maximize a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility 
function of wealth. Designating the weighted probability of possible outcome t as  t v
 then, 
(3.)  t t t NR NR NR 2 2 1 1 v v + =    
Where, 
t o t NR W W + =   
o W  = initial wealth and  t NR = net return from different scenarios which are stochastic.  Given 
a risk aversion coefficient r, 
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Where, his the weight assigned based on the probability of possible outcome t.   9 
The CAWFI revenue to count is calculated as,  
(6.)  ∑ ´ ´ =
i
c i i f i RC Y P A CAWFI , ,         
Where,  RC CAWFI is revenue to count,  f i A ,  is planted acres of crop i, on farm f,  i P  is output 
price of crop i, and  c i Y ,  is yield for crop i in county c. 
The guaranteed revenue under CAWFI customizing with appropriate weights is as 
follows,  
(7.)    ( ) ( ) CL Y E P E CAWFI c i i i f i Guar ´ ´ ´ =∑ , , m
 
Where, 
Guar CAWFI = guaranteed revenue under CAWFI,  f i, m = appropriate weight for the planted 
acres of crop i in the farm f, CL = coverage level,  ( ) i P E = expected output price for crop i, 
( ) c i Y E , = expected yield for crop i in county c. 
(8.)  { } [ ] RC Guar INDEMNITY CAWFI CAWFI Max CAWFI - = , 0  
To pay indemnities, revenue to count should be lower than guaranteed revenue. Net revenue 
for a farm that purchases CAWFI is the sum of net revenue without CAWFI plus any CAWFI 
indemnity minus the CAWFI premium.  
(9.).  ) ( PREMIUM INDEMNITY NETREV NETREV CAWFI CAWFI NOPROG CAWFI - + =  
Ending wealth for the farm will be the sum of beginning wealth and CAWFINETREV. 
  For purposes of comparison, similar calculations are performed for a hypothetical 
farm level whole farm insurance product. Certainty equivalents are calculated as  
(10).   o
Uj E
j W e CE - =  if r=1, 
o
r
j j W r EU CE - - = - 1
1
) 1 (   if r≠1.   10 
Where, EUj is expected utility for scenario j, Wo is initial wealth, and CEj is certainty 
equivalent of scenario j. 
Data 
 Our analysis is based on a representative cotton-soybean-corn farm in Yazoo County, 
Mississippi. Historical county yield data from 1975 to 2009 were obtained from the National 
Agricultural Statistics Services (NASS). For the same years, the US national marketing year 
average (MYA) prices were collected from the Economic Research Service (ERS). The 
within-year future price changes for the same year were also collected. Farm-yield was 
simulated from the county yield according to Miranda’s formulations as described in Coble 
and Dismukes (2008) as follows; 
(11.)  t f c t c f f t f y Y , , , ) ( e m b m + - + =  
Where, Yf t  and yct  are random farm yield and county yield respectively at period t,  
 f  and  c  are the expected farm and county yield, βf  is the responsiveness of farm yield to 
deviations from expected county yield, and ε ft is the idiosyncratic risk. 
 Developing the CAWFI   Model 
 Monte Carlo simulation is one of the most popular sampling methods that can 
generate thousands of data of having same properties as of original set of data.  The 
multivariate stochastic simulation technique proposed by Anderson, Harri, and Coble (2009) 
was used to generate correlated samples and used to evaluate the CAWFI design. 
To use the PQH simulation technique, first, the yield trend was estimated and 
removed from the data before fitting parametric distributions. Several studies in agricultural 
economics support the use of beta distribution for yield data, and log normal distribution for 
price data (Roberts, Goodwin, and Coble, 1998).  Crop yield is non-negative, and the beta 
distribution ranges from 0 to 1, but can be scaled to any interval. However, one must define 
the upper and lower bound for scaling.  Price and yield are both non-negatives having lower   11 
bound value zero. These parametric assumptions were imposed on the historical data.  The 
marginal probability distribution and correlation matrix for the original data set were 
obtained. Using Eigen values decompositions of the correlation matrix, 100,000 sample data 
for prices and yields were generated through PQH simulation technique to stabilize the 
results. The rank correlation as well as descriptive statistics of original data and simulated 
data was tested using t-test whether the simulated data match the original set of data.  
Assuming farmers are risk-averse, returns from CAWFI was computed and converted 
to utility values using the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) function as mentioned 
above. A CRRA risk aversion coefficient of 1 indicates somewhat risk averse; 2.0 indicate 
moderately risk averse; 3.0 indicate risk averse; and 4.0 indicates extremely risk averse 
(Hardaker et al., 2004: pp92-120). The expected utility under no insurance program, CAWFI, 
and farm level whole farm Insurance (CFWFI) were converted into certainty equivalents.  
The certainty equivalent for differing expected utility risk aversion values were compared to 
measure the benefit of CAWFI to producers of varying risk aversion levels under different 
coverage level. Sensitivity analysis was conducted on the risk aversion coefficient assuming 
CRRA utility function of wealth. 
 Results and Discussion 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of data used in representative farm 
modeling. This analysis has constructed four different types of crop mix in the representative 
corn-cotton-soybean farm in Mississippi based on acres percentage of the crop in the farm. 
All three crops sharing one third of acres in the farm would be called as evenly distributed 
acres in the farm. The farm where one crop is assumed to share 70% of total acres is major 
crop and remaining two shares 15% each allows specification of three different farm type; 
corn major, soybean major, and cotton major farms. Insurance coverage level at 70%, 80%,   12 
and 90% have taken to compare the three different scenarios; no insurance program, CAWFI 
program, and CFWFI program based on their certainty equivalents and indemnities paid 
values under various risk levels and farm types. 
Comparison across Coverage Levels 
The certainty equivalents and indemnities paid for different crop mix with various 
coverage level for the highly risk averse decision makers (risk aversion coefficient r= 3), are 
presented in table 2. Here, the certainty equivalents for CAWFI are slightly higher than no 
insurance program. The cotton major Mississippi farm at 90% coverage level, CAWFI 
produces 1.07% higher certainty equivalents than no insurance program for the same farm 
type at the same coverage level. The ordering of certainty equivalents under CAWFI relative 
to no program are cotton farm, evenly distributed acres in the farm, corn farm, and soybean 
major Mississippi farm for all coverage levels in descending order. The CFWFI program has 
substantially higher certainty equivalents relative to CAWFI for all type of farm and all 
coverage levels in Mississippi. The lowest difference is for the evenly distributed acres in the 
farm at 70% coverage level which is 2.70%, and the highest difference is 13.63% which is in 
cotton major farm at 90% coverage level- others are in between.  
An evaluation of indemnity paid levels shows CAWFI has sharply lower rate than 
CFWFI for all types of farm and all coverage levels. The CFWFI indemnities differences 
relative to CAWFI are higher in lower coverage level as compared to higher coverage levels. 
For example, the Mississippi cotton farm with 70% coverage level has $23342 indemnity in  
CFWFI and $77 indemnity in CAWFI. For the  same type of farm at 90% coverage level, 
CFWFI indemnity is $66679 and  CAWFI indemnity is $7870.  On the other side, cotton 
major Mississippi farm has highest indemnities for CFWFI over CAWFI and then Soybean 
major, corn major, and evenly distributed acres farm in the descending order for the various   13 
coverage levels. The indemnities under CAWFI are seems more or less similar under 
different crop mix at the same coverage levels.  It is clear the county based program is 
cheaper and higher coverages may be obtained from CAWFI than from CFWFI.  For 
example for the evenly distributed acres farm a 90% CAWFI policy would cost roughly the 
same as a 70% CFWFI policy.  However, it is also apparent that the 70% CFWFI provides 
greater risk reduction.  
Comparison across Risk Aversion Levels and Farm Types 
Table 3 summarizes the certainty equivalents and indemnities paid under different 
farm types having varying risk aversion levels at 80% coverage level. At 80% coverage level, 
for all four different types of crop mix and four different risk aversion levels of decision 
makers, CAWFI produced slightly higher certainty equivalents over no insurance program in 
Mississippi. Though it is not that big difference, CAWFI has produced higher percentage 
difference over no insurance program as the risk aversion level of decision makers increases. 
For all four risk level, extremely risk averse decision makers(r=4) have highest difference of 
CAWFI over no insurance program as compared to very risk averse(r=3), moderately risk 
averse(r=2), and some what risk averse(r=1) in descending order. The other product, CFWFI, 
produces higher certainty equivalent values as compared to CAWFI regardless of farm type 
and coverage levels. The differences are bigger in higher level of risk aversion as compared 
with lower level of risk aversion.  For example, extremely risk averse decision maker in 
cotton major Mississippi farm can produce 15.97% higher certainty equivalents under 
CFWFI as compared with the same farm type with somewhat risk averse decision makers.  
Conclusions 
The CAWFI model is able to produce at least slightly higher certainty equivalents as 
compared to no insurance program. However, these certainty equivalent values are lower   14 
while comparing with CFWFI.  Keep in mind that there is reason to doubt that CFWFI is a 
workable insurance plan.  In this study it used as a benchmark for comparison.  CAWFI has 
lower indemnity paid as compared to CFWFI regardless of risk aversion levels, coverage 
levels, and farm types.  Thus, a comparison of products with equal cost would involve higher 
coverages for the CAWFI product.  Note also that if federal subsidies were applied as is the 
case with GRP/GRIP, then the higher priced product would also receive more subsidies.   
There are several areas where this study could be extended.  First, the replication of 
this study in other geographical locations with different crop mix would be useful to see if 
these results are robust.  Further, the weights used for the CAWFI product were proportion of 
farm revenue.  Other weights could be examined to see if they produce more risk reduction.  
Finally it is unlikely that CAWFI would become the sole farm program or that it would be 
unsubsidized.  Thus, an examination of how CAWFI may be integrated with other program 
may be a relevant practical application.     15 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of Data Used in Representative Farm Models    
Variable  Mean  Std Dev  Minimum  Maximum 
End Future Price of Corn  5.190  0.524  2.822  7.607 
End Future Price of soybean  9.802  1.538  3.380  16.291 
End Marketing year average price 
of Corn  5.017  0.492  3.097  7.121 
End marketing year average Price 
of soybean  10.086  1.285  4.810  15.818 
End future Price of Cotton  0.808  0.120  0.288  1.416 
End Marketing year average price 
of Cotton  0.806  0.106  0.336  1.241 
Corn Farm Yield  149.667  45.268  34.034  250.878 
Corn county yield  148.702  12.588  109.275  188.892 
Corn State yield  139.575  11.034  106.290  171.626 
Soybean Farm Yield  36.109  21.903  1.855  118.271 
Soybean County Yield  32.782  6.367  18.437  48.847 
Soybean State Yield  34.620  5.014  22.893  47.397 
Cotton farm Yield  831.205  419.871  110.671  1947.110 
Cotton County Yield  836.069  124.934  503.372  1175.410 
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Table 2: (r=3). Certainty equivalents ,CE ( after subtracting indemnities) and Indemnities  in 
No program, CAWFI, and CFWFI in  the given condition: Initial wealth=$100,000.,  Risk 
aversion coefficient= 3. 
Coverage level 




higher to no 
program) 
CE in 










Evenly Distribution of  acres in the farm 
CLf=0.7, Cla=0.9  545834  0.44  2.70  7870  7949 
CLf=0.8, CLa=0.9  545834  0.46  4.35  7806  17628 
CLf=0.9, CLa=0.9  545834  0.45  5.94  7832  34336 
CLf=0.8, CLa=0.8  545834  0.12  4.26  1256  17336 
CLf=0.7, CLa=0.7  545834  0.01  2.70  78  7534 
Corn is major crop in the farm 
CLf=0.7, Cla=0.9  626883  0.27  2.99  7796  9002 
CLf=0.8, CLa=0.9  626883  0.28  4.84  7899  20619 
CLf=0.9, CLa=0.9  626883  0.28  6.46  7947  38990 
CLf=0.8, CLa=0.8  626883  0.09  4.82  1256  20703 
CLf=0.7, CLa=0.7  626883  0.01  3.04  88  9132 
Soybean is major crop in the farm 
CLf=0.7, Cla=0.9  394035  0.06  6.01  7851  14251 
CLf=0.8, CLa=0.9  394035  0.04  8.36  7879  27043 
CLf=0.9, CLa=0.9  394035  0.08  10.73  7770  45431 
CLf=0.8, CLa=0.8  394035  0.04  8.44  1266  27175 
CLf=0.7, CLa=0.7  394035  0.00  6.00  88  14299 
23617 
CLf=0.7, Cla=0.9  520154  1.06  8.20  7912  23617 
CLf=0.8, CLa=0.9  520154  0.46  10.30  7723  41655 
CLf=0.9, CLa=0.9  520154  1.07  13.63  7870  66679 
CLf=0.8, CLa=0.8  520154  0.29  11.06  1277  42143 
CLf=0.7, CLa=0.7  520154  0.02  8.10  77  23342 
           
*CLa and CLf are Coverage level at area and farm level programs.     
**corn-soybean-cotton acres ratio 34:33:33 is evenly distribution.     
*** Major crop occupies 70% acres and rest  2 crops occupy  15% of total acres in the farm. 
****CAWFI is customizable area whole farm 
insurance       
*****CFWFI is whole farm insurance based on farm level yield.     
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Table 3:  Certainty equivalents ,CE ( after subtracting indemnities) and Indemnities in No 
program, CAWFI, and CFWFI in varying risk aversion coefficient in the given condition: 
Initial wealth=$100,000.,  coverage Level 0.80 under various risk aversion coefficients. 
Risk aversion 
Coefficient 




higher to no 
program) 
CE in 











Evenly Distribution of  acres in the farm 
1  584236  0.033  1.061  1245      17256 
2  565670  0.07  2.52  1277  17540 
3  545834  0.12  4.26  1256  17336 
4  525880  0.19  6.53  1276  17461 
Corn is major crop in the farm 
1  675164  0.02  1.16  1213  20414 
2  651485  0.05  2.70  1240  20270 
3  626883  0.09  4.82  1256  20703 
4  602168  0.12  7.34  1251  20512 
Soybean is major crop in the farm 
1  442104  0.00  2.16  1287  26907 
2  417550  0.02  5.00  1244  27085 
3  394035  0.04  8.44  1266  27175 
4  371777  0.06  12.37  1256  27251 
Cotton is major crop in the farm 
1  597609  0.07  2.80  1253  41749 
2  557538  0.20  6.65  1244  42320 
3  520154  0.29  11.06  1277  42143 
4  485615  0.39  15.97  1249  41891 
           
*CLa and CLf are Coverage level at area and farm level programs.     
**corn-soybean-cotton acres ratio 34:33:33 is evenly distribution.     
*** Major crop occupies 70% acres and rest  2 crops occupy  15% of total acres in the farm. 
****CAWFI is customizable area whole farm 
insurance       
*****CFWFI is whole farm insurance based on farm level yield.     
 